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Introduction
Common Article 1 to the four Geneva Conventions establishes an obligation 
to ensure respect for International Humanitarian Law (hereinafter, IHL) at all times. 
This summary obligation has developed over the decades and is now understood 
to enshrine a mechanism of  ‘collective responsibility’1 whereby all State parties commit 
to adopt all the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent and stop violations 
of  IHL, but also to prosecute them when they amount to war crimes. This third 
dimension is contained in Articles 49/50/129/146 of  the four Geneva Conventions, 
which impose an obligation on its State parties to extradite or prosecute (aut dedere aut 
judicare) alleged perpetrators of  grave breaches, including on the basis of  universal 
jurisdiction if  deemed necessary.2 Over time, the regime has evolved, most notably as 
a competing system of  criminal responsibility – over war crimes – has developed at 
the international level.3 The grave breaches mechanism has indeed produced mixed 
results, but it certainly remains relevant when assessing the instruments established 
at domestic level to prosecute alleged contraveners of  IHL. 
While the EU lacks competence in this matter, its potential in implementing 
the aut dedere aut judicare principle in relation to violations of  IHL should not be 
disregarded. Indeed, from a constitutional perspective, this question has become an 
EU concern, given its ambition to become a leader in human rights on the international 
stage, as established by Articles 2, 3, and 21 TEU. In this sense, participating in the 
fight against impunity is a component of  the rule of  law and a fundamental aspect of  
the respect for fundamental rights. In this context, the EU has extensively developed 
a policy of  promotion and ensuring support to international criminal justice in 
general4 and contemporaneously acknowledging that national prosecution is not 
only a priority, but also a consequence of  the creation of  the International Criminal 
Court (hereinafter, ICC). The EU therefore recognizes that EU Member States must 
cooperate with the ICC pursuant to the principle of  complementarity. This concern 
is all the more relevant with regard to violations of  IHL, as the EU seems to have 
endorsed the obligation to ensure respect for IHL, notably with the adoption of  
1 Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Luigi Condorelli “Common Article 1 of  the Geneva Conventions 
revisited: Protecting collective interests”, International Review of  the Red Cross 837 (2000): 67-87. 
2 “Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to 
have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of  their nationality, before 
its own courts. It may also, if  it prefers, and in accordance with the provisions of  its own legislation, hand such persons 
over for trial to another High Contracting Party concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has made out a 
prima facie case. Each High Contracting Party shall take measures necessary for the suppression of  all acts contrary 
to the provisions of  the present Convention other than the grave breaches defined in [Article 50 of  the 1949 Geneva 
Convention I, Article 51 of  the 1949 Geneva Convention II, Article 130 of  the 1949 Geneva Convention III and 
Article 147 of  the 1949 Geneva Convention IV]”. 
3 Marko Divac Öberg, “The absorption of  grave breaches into war crimes law”, International Review of  
the Red Cross 91, nº. 873 (2009): 163-83. 
4 See, e.g.: Jan Wouters and Basu Sudeshna, “The Creation of  a Global Justice System: The European 
Union and the International Criminal Court” in The Effectiveness of  International Criminal Tribunals, ed. 
Cédric Ryngaert (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2009); Florence Hartmann, “The ICTY and EU conditionality” 
in War crimes, conditionality and EU integration in the Western Balkans. Chaillot Paper nº 116, ed. Judy Batt 
and Jelena Obradovic-Wochnik. (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2009); Antonis Antoniadis 
and Olympia Bekou, “The EU and the ICC: an awkward symbiosis in interesting times”, International 
Criminal Law Review 7, nº. 4 (2008): 621-655; European Parliament, Mainstreaming Support for the ICC in 
the EU’s Policies (2014). 
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the ‘Guidelines on promoting compliance with IHL’ (hereinafter, IHL Guidelines).5 In this 
regard, the latter expressly refer to the fight against impunity, insinuating that the 
different operational means at the disposal at the EU to implement the Guidelines 
are also available on this matter. 
Against this background, the objective of  this article is to analyze whether, and 
to what extent the EU has developed instruments to facilitate the national prosecution 
of  alleged war criminals in accordance with the aut dedere aut judicare principle.
In this context, the EU has adopted a range of  tools to foster judicial cooperation 
among EU Member States to prevent the EU from becoming a safe haven for 
perpetrators,6 which echo the different components of  the aut dedere aut judicare 
principle, as provided by the Geneva Conventions. Indeed, the EU has adopted 
several legal and policy measures that assist Member States in implementing their 
obligations to a) provide for effective penal sanctions; b) search out and investigate 
alleged perpetrators; c) prosecute, including on the basis of  universal jurisdiction, 
and; d) to provide for extradition mechanisms in relation to violations of  IHL, even 
though they necessarily need to be adapted to the EU special legal framework. 
The endorsement at EU level of  key principles of  criminal law with regard 
to the violations of  IHL is first examined and followed by an analysis of  the 
different operational instruments established at EU level to assist Member States in 
implementing their obligation.  
1. Prosecuting violations of  IHL: endorsement of  key principles
The EU has been an important promoter of  international criminal law, including 
the fight against impunity regarding war crimes. It proclaims that it is committed to 
ending impunity for the most serious crimes and therefore, strongly supports the 
dissemination of  international criminal law. Following the example of  the UN, the 
EU projects the idea that peace may be achieved only if  justice is made and alleged 
perpetrators of  the most serious international crimes are prosecuted.7 EU Member 
States formalised this commitment to fight against impunity, including in several 
legally binding instruments.
 
1.1. The fight against impunity as an EU objective
In Council Common Position 2001/443/CFSP of  11 June 2001 on the 
International Criminal Court, they expressed that international core crimes are “of  
concern for all Member States” so that EU Member States should “cooperate for the prevention 
5 On this aspect, see: Bettina Steible, Chapter on “Externalizing European values: the case of  
International Humanitarian Law” in Paz y valores europeos como posible modelo de integración y progreso en un 
mundo global (Peter Lang, forthcoming 2018). 
6 Strategy of  the EU Genocide Network to combat impunity for the crime of  genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes within the European Union and its Member States, 2014, 15581/1/14 
Rev 1 (hereafter, ‘EU Genocide Network Strategy’), 3; The Stockholm Programme, – An open and 
secure Europe serving and protecting citizens, OJ C 115/1 of  4 May 2010 (hereafter, ‘Stockholm 
Programme’), 8. 
7 ICC, 7th session of  the Assembly of  State parties, General debate, Declaration of  Mr. Jean-François 
Blarel, Ambassador of  France in the Netherlands, Head of  Delegation, on behalf  of  the European 
Union, The Hague, 14 November 2008: “… une paix durable ne peut être réalisée si les exigences de la justice et 
la recherche des responsabilités individuelles pour les crimes internationaux les plus graves ne reçoivent pas une réponse 
appropriée”. 
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of  those crimes and for putting an end to the impunity of  the perpetrators thereof”.8 The fight 
against impunity was then enshrined as an objective in the Stockholm Program,9 in 
which EU institutions are invited to “continue support and promote Union and Member 
States’ activity against impunity and to fight against crimes of  genocide, crimes against humanity and 
war crimes”.10 Finally, Council Decision 2011/168/CFSP of  21 March 2011 endorsed 
these statements, as its Recital also states that “[t]he Union and its Member States are 
determined to put an end to the impunity of  the perpetrators of  those crimes by taking measures at 
national level and by enhancing international cooperation to ensure their effective prosecution”.11 It 
is also worth mentioning in this regard that the EU established an annual ‘EU Day 
against impunity’, which aims to raise awareness on international core crimes, to 
promote prosecution, as well as to “appropriately recognize the common efforts of  the EU 
Member States and the European Union in enforcing international criminal law”.12
The fight against impunity is understood as one component of  the EU’s prior 
objectives in particular regarding the EU’s founding values and its commitment 
towards the universal principles of  liberty, democracy, the rule of  law, human rights, 
and fundamental freedoms.13 EU Member States made this commitment clear on 
several occasions, using the provisions on the EU’s founding values and on their 
externalisation as the legal basis for the EU’s action on this matter. 
By way of  example, the Recital of  Council Common Position 2001/443/CFSP 
refers to “the consolidation of  the rule of  law and respect for human rights, as well as the 
preservation of  peace and the strengthening of  international security” as the EU legal basis to 
act on this matter. It then explicitly integrates the principles of  the Rome Statute into 
the EU’s objectives “[…] the principles of  the Rome Statute of  the International Criminal 
Court, as well as those regulating its functioning, are fully in line with the principles and objectives of  
the EU”.14 In Council Decision 2011/168/CFSP of  21 March 2011, the EU Member 
States confirmed and further detailed those elements, as they based their Decision 
on Article 21 of  the Treaty on the European Union: “In its action on the international 
scene, the Union seeks to advance the principles of  democracy, the rule of  law, the universality and 
indivisibility of  human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, equality and 
solidarity, and respect for the principles of  the United Nations Charter and international law, as 
provided for in article 21 of  the Treaty”.15 For a more recent example on the matter, EU 
Member States explicitly reiterated this commitment in 2016 in their ‘Conclusions on 
the fight against impunity for the crime of  genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes within 
the European Union and its Member States’. The Recital states that the EU “…is founded on 
the values of  liberty, democracy, the rule of  law and respect for human rights”.16 Consequently, 
8 Council Common Position 2001/443/CFSP of  11 June 2001 on the International Criminal Court, 
OJ L 150 of  18.6.2003, 67–9, Recital 4. 
9 The Stockholm Programme was adopted on 4 May 2010. It established the priorities of  the EU 
in the area of  freedom and security for the period 2010-2014 and replaced the Hague Programme. 
See: The Stockholm Programme – An open and secure Europe serving and protecting citizens, OJ C 
115/1 of  04.05.2010, 1-38. 
10 Stockholm Programme, 8. 
11 Council Decision 2011/168/CFSP of  21 March 2011, OJ L 76 of  22.03.2011, 56, recital 6.  
12 Presidency report of  the EU Day against impunity of  genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes, 23 May 2016, Eurojust, The Hague (10233/16). 
13 Wouters and Sudeshna, “The Creation of  a Global Justice System…”, 5.  
14 Council Common Position 2001/443/CFSP of  11 June 2001 on the International Criminal Court, 
OJ L 150 of  18.6.2003, 67–69, Recital 3. 
15 Council Decision 2011/168/CFSP of  21 March 2011, OJ L 76 of  22.03.2011, 56, recital, para. 1.  
16 Council Conclusions on fight against impunity for the crimes of  genocide, crimes against humanity 
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the codification of  the EU’s founding values and of  their externalization has not 
become dead letter. Rather, they serve as the legal basis for the EU’s action in the fight 
against impunity on the international scene. The EU therefore, explicitly legitimises 
its action on this matter on the basis of  Article 2 TEU. 
This commitment extends to violations of  both IHL and International Human 
Rights Law (hereinafter, IHRL), in particular, with regards to the so-called ‘core 
international crimes’. It is manifested both externally and internally. In this respect, the 
EU has used its CFSP to promote the fight against impunity on the international 
stage, notably through the adoption of  guidelines. The IHL Guidelines are of  
utmost importance in this regard, but it is also possible to refer to the ‘Guidelines to 
the EU policy toward third countries, on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment’,17 the ‘EU Guidelines on Children and Armed Conflict’,18  or the ‘EU Guidelines 
on violence against women and girls and combating all forms of  discrimination against them’.19
1.2. A general endorsement of international criminal responsibility over 
war crimes
Firstly, the EU has recognized, although in general terms, the concept of  
individual criminal responsibility for international crimes. In this context, what 
is touched upon is the regulation of  the status of  the alleged perpetrator in the 
sense that it has consistently supported the recognition of  international criminal 
responsibility over violations of  IHL. This commitment is formalised in the IHL 
Guidelines, “Individuals bear personal responsibility for war crimes. States must, in accordance 
with their national law, ensure that alleged perpetrators are brought before their own domestic courts 
or handed over for trial by the courts of  another State or by an international criminal tribunal, 
such as the International Criminal Court”.20 Even though the formulation is quite vague, 
it reminds an essential element of  international law which has further been reiterated 
in numerous declarations. 
As for immunity, some recommendations are addressed to EU Member States 
in the EU ‘Genocide Network Strategy to combat impunity for the crime of  genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes within the European Union and its Member States’. The underlying 
premise is that immunity should not be understood as allowing safe havens on EU 
territory, thus encouraging EU Member States to develop “national guidelines in line 
with international standards and clarify this area of  law applicable to relevant ministries and 
criminal justice authorities”.21 It is likewise interesting to note that the 2013, ‘Toolkit for 
bridging the gap between international and national justice’, elaborated within the frame of  
its external action, states that the official capacity as a Head of  State or government 
or a member of  Government or Parliament shall, in no case, exempt a person from 
criminal responsibility in national law “as there should be no exceptions in the fight against 
impunity”, while recognizing that this may involve constitutional issues, which “may 
and war crimes within the European Union and its Member States (15584/2/14), 15-16 June 2015. 
17 Council of  the European Union, Guidelines to EU Policy towards third countries on torture 
and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment - An up-date of  the Guidelines 
(6129/1/12), Brussels, 20.03.2012. 
18 Council of  the European Union, Update of  the EU guidelines on children and armed conflict, 
16.06.2008. 
19 Council of  the European Union, EU Guidelines on violence against women and girls and combating 
all forms of  discrimination against them, 08.12.2008. 
20 IHL Guidelines, para. 13/14.  
21 EU Genocide Network Strategy, Measure 4. 
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need to be resolved, either by interpretation or amendment”.22
Secondly, EU Member States formalised their recognition of  the notion of  war 
crimes in the IHL Guidelines, in which they underlined the necessity to prosecute 
such crimes. In this regard, even though the wording of  the Guidelines is quite 
vague, it refers to several key concepts. In particular, it recognizes that certain “serious 
violations of  IHL are defined as war crimes”, thereby acknowledging the link existing 
between IHL and international criminal law, two branches of  international law which 
meet at the notion of  war crimes.23 By giving its opinion on numerous declarations 
where it has called for the repression of  serious violations of  IHL and the need 
to prosecute their perpetrators,24 the Union has initiated a movement followed 
progressively by international organizations and States, which culminated in the 
creation of  international ad hoc tribunals and the adoption of  the Statute of  Rome.25 
The EU recognizes international criminal law as forming part of  IHL. The list 
of  “principal legal instruments of  IHL” contained in the Annex of  the IHL Guidelines 
refers to the statutes of  the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC.26 In the same line, in the document 
on the ‘Use of  Force Concept for EU-led Military Crisis Management Operations’, the EU 
confirms that the Statute of  the ICC is an integral part of  IHL: “References to the 
Law of  Armed Conflict (LOAC) or International Humanitarian Law (IHL) are deemed to 
include, where applicable, inter alia, the Geneva Conventions of  12 August 1949, the Protocols 
additional to these Conventions of  8 June 1977 and the Statute of  the International Criminal 
Court, Rome, 17 July 1998”.27 The latter example is significant in the sense that the 
Rome Statute is the only legal text not belonging to IHL which is referred to, and no 
mention is made to the 1907 Hague Regulations in the text of  the IHL Guidelines,28 
even though they are considered the most important IHL treaty norms alongside 
the Geneva Conventions. On another level, the 2009 ‘Council Conclusions on promoting 
compliance with IHL’ highlight the importance of  criminalizing serious violations of  
IHL: “The Council affirms its strong opposition to impunity for serious violations of  international 
humanitarian law and human rights law. (…) The Council emphasizes the importance of  dealing 
effectively with the legacy of  serious violations of  international humanitarian and human rights law 
22 European Commission, High Representative of  the European Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy, Joint Staff  Working Document on advancing the principle of  complementarity, 
Toolkit for bridging the gap between international and national justice, SWD(2013) 26 final, Brussels, 
31.01.2013, 19. 
23 Council of  the European Union, Guidelines to EU Policy towards third countries on torture 
and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment - An up-date of  the Guidelines 
(6129/1/12), Brussels, 20.03.2012. 
24 See, e.g.: Declaration by the High Representative Catherine Ashton on behalf  of  the European Union 
on Libya, Brussels, 23 February 2011, 6966/1/11 REV 1 PRESSE 36; Council conclusions on Côte 
d’Ivoire, 3065th Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 31 January 2011; Declaration by the High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton on behalf  of  the European 
Union on the Office of  the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) Report of  the Mapping 
Exercise documenting the most serious violations of  human rights and international humanitarian law 
committed within the territory of  the Democratic Republic of  the Congo between March 1993 and 
June 2003, 6 October 2010, Brussels; Council Conclusions on Sri Lanka, 2942nd General Affairs Council 
Meeting, Brussels, 18 May 2009; EU annual report on human rights 2008, 175. 
25 Tristan Ferraro, “Le Droit International Humanitaire dans la Politique Étrangère et de Sécurité 
Commune de l’Union Européenne”, Revue Internationale de La Croix Rouge 84 (2009): 448. 
26 IHL Guidelines, Annex. 
27 Use of  Force Concept for EU-led Military Crisis Management Operations – 1st revision, Brussels, 
28 February 2006, 6877/06, EXT 1 (31.03.2010). 
28 IHL Guidelines, para. 8. 
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by supporting appropriate accountability mechanisms”.29 As a result, international criminal 
law is understood as an integral part of  IHL. By doing so, the EU participates in the 
international consensus on the criminalisation of  the most serious violations of  IHL 
on a conceptual level and thus, reinforces the opinio juris in this sense. 
In this context, the IHL Guidelines refer to the notion of  war crimes in broad 
terms “Certain serious violations of  IHL are defined as war crimes. War crimes may occur in the 
same circumstances as genocide and crimes against humanity but the latter, unlike war crimes, are 
not linked to the existence of  an armed conflict”.30 With this wording, the EU emphasizes 
the close relationship between war crimes, genocides and crimes against humanity. 
They all are considered the most serious violations of  international law and are 
punishable, not only at national level, but also at the international level. However, 
the Guidelines do not provide for a definition of  all these crimes. Instead of  defining 
what war crimes, genocide and crime against humanity are, the Guidelines underline 
their differences in terms of  ratione temporis only. 
Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning that the EU’s practice seems to have 
focused on the notion of  ‘war crimes’, instead of  those of  ‘grave breaches’ and 
‘serious violations’, typical of  IHL. The wording of  the Guidelines does not seem to 
establish any kind of  differentiated procedural regime, depending on the nature of  
the violation, as is the case in IHL. Indeed, the obligation to prosecute or extradite 
was designed with regards to grave breaches only. However, the Guidelines refer to 
war crimes and do not even mention the grave breaches in relation to the obligation. 
Therefore, even though the wording is quite imprecise, it seems to endorse the 
alignment of  the procedural regime of  war crimes occurring in international and 
non-international armed conflicts. In practice, the EU has called to hold the criminal 
responsibility of  persons responsible for IHL violations, regardless of  the nature 
of  the armed conflict.31 Furthermore, the EU recognized the authority of  the 
Rome Statute of  the ICC by means of  a Council Decision,32 so that it endorses 
the criminalisation of  violations of  IHL occurring both in international and non-
international armed conflicts, as enshrined in Article 8. Thus, through its practice 
and pursuant to the Guidelines, the EU participates in the movement of  alignment 
of  the legal regimes of  international and non-international armed conflicts and 
focuses on the notion of  ‘war crimes’.
In addition, the EU, together with some active Member States, has proven to 
advocate successfully for the extension of  the list of  behaviors that may constitute 
‘war crimes’. On the occasion of  the Review Conference of  the Rome Statute of  
the ICC held in Kampala, Uganda, in 2010, the delegation of  Belgium lobbied to 
include some new war crimes applying to armed conflicts not of  an international 
character. Negotiations came out in the favor of  the delegation of  Belgium which 
materialised in three war crimes being added to the already long list of  war crimes 
contained in the Rome Statute. These crimes are the following: employing poison 
or poisoned weapons;33 employing asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all 
29 Council conclusions on promoting compliance with international humanitarian law, 2985th Foreign 
Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 8 December 2009. 
30 IHL Guidelines, para. 13/14. 
31 Ferraro, 447. 
32 Council Decision 2011/168/CFSP of  21 March 2011 on the International Criminal Court repealing 
Council Common Position 2003/444/CFSP, OJ L 76 of  22.03.2011, 56. 
33 Rome Statute of  the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 90, art. 8(2)(b)(xvii). 
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analogous liquids, materials and devices;34 and employing bullets which expand or 
flatten easily in the human body such as bullets with a hard envelope which does 
not entirely cover the core or is pierced with incisions.35 The argument raised was 
notably that these crimes constitute “serious violation of  the laws and customs applicable in 
armed conflicts not of  an international character, as reflected in customary international law”.36 
The results of  this Conference were acknowledged by the Council,37 which adopted 
a new Decision on the International Criminal Court,38 notably in order to integrate 
these new crimes in its policy action.
In the same line, the EU has focused on the criminalisation of  sexual violence 
occurring in armed conflict. By way of  example, it reaffirms the commitment to 
eliminate “all forms of  discrimination and violence towards women and girls, notably by putting 
an end to impunity and ensuring the protection of  civilians, especially women and girls, during and 
after armed conflicts, as IHL and IHRL impose the obligation to the States”.39 It is recalled 
that, pursuant to the Rome Statute, rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced 
pregnancy, forced sterilization and any other form of  sexual violence constitute war 
crimes when they are committed in situations of  armed conflict and also, in some 
very specific circumstances, of  crimes against humanity.40
Thus, the EU, a staunch supporter of  the fight against impunity, considered 
the curtailment of  sexual violence against women and girls to be one of  its prior 
objectives. This political support has extended to, inter alia, war crimes, which are 
understood in accordance with the current state of  international law, since they 
include not only ‘grave breaches’ but also ‘serious violations’ of  IHL and entail new 
behaviors, such as sexual violence. Nonetheless, all these elements are quite vague 
due to the lack of  competence of  the EU to enact penal legislation on this matter. 
1.3. The EU’s uneven support to universal jurisdiction
The position of  the EU towards universal jurisdiction is ambiguous. Indeed, 
the EU institutions’ political support for the establishment of  universal jurisdiction 
mechanisms at domestic level is uneven. Furthermore, the EU recognizes the 
importance of  universal jurisdiction, but only with regard to non-EU nationals 
seeking to enter and reside in the EU and in non-legally binding provisions. In spite 
of  that, the EU has financially supported several non-governmental organizations 
promoting universal jurisdiction.   
Firstly, the EU’s institutions political support to universal jurisdiction, inside 
and outside Europe, has been uneven. This is the case with the European Parliament, 
which has expressly done so on numerous occasions, by means of  its resolutions. 
In this respect, it first stated such support unambiguously in a 2000 Resolution on 
34 Ibid. art. 8(2)(b)(xviii). 
35 Ibid. art. 8(2)(b)(xix).  
36 Rome Statute amendment proposals, Report of  the Working Group on other amendments, RC/11, 
annex IV, accessed December 5, 2017, https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/RC2010/RC-11-
Annex.IV-ENG.pdf. 
37 Council Conclusions on the Review Conference of  the Rome Statute of  the International Criminal 
Court, Kampala, Uganda, from 31 May to 11 June 2010, 25 May 2010.  
38 Council Decision 2011/168/CFSP of  21 March 2011 on the International Criminal Court repealing 
Council Common Position 2003/444/CFSP, OJ L 76 of  22.03.2011, 56. 
39 6072/1/05 REV (Presse 19). 
40 Josiane Auvret-Finck, “L’utilisation du DIH dans les instruments de la PESC” in L’UE et Le Droit 
International Humanitaire, Colloque Nice 18-19 Juin 2009, ed. Anne-Laure Chaumette (Paris: Pedone, 
2010), 54. 
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the situation in East Timor in the following terms, “23. Considers that the Union should 
be committed to the principle of  universal jurisdiction and no safe havens for the perpetrators of  
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity and torture; 24. Calls on the Member States to 
enact the necessary legislation to permit domestic prosecution of  genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and torture, regardless of  where these crimes were committed”.41
It is, therefore, interesting that the European Parliament endorsed the principle 
of  universal jurisdiction and called on the EU to support it, but further enjoined 
EU Member States to enshrine it into their domestic legislation. In subsequent 
resolutions, the European Parliament has called on third States – most importantly 
the USA42 and the African Union Member States,43 the EU,44 and EU Member States45 
to codify and enforce universal jurisdiction. Furthermore, it has welcomed on several 
occasions “the progress made in the application of  universal jurisdiction in some Member States” 
46ith regard to proceedings taking place in Spain and the UK. Yet, it should be noted 
that the European Parliament remained silent regarding proceedings taking place in 
Belgium, Germany, or Spain against US, Chinese, Iranian, and Israeli officials.47
41 European Parliament Resolution on the situation in East Timor, OJ C 54 of  25/02/2000, 97-98. 
42 European Parliament Resolution on Human Rights in the world in 2001 and European Union 
human rights policy (2001/2011(INI)), para. 44: “Calls on the Member States to appeal to all UN Member 
States, in particular the United States, to ratify or accede to the Rome Statute setting up the International Criminal 
Court and to enact effective universal jurisdiction legislation”. 
43 European Parliament resolution on the Special Court for Sierra Leone: the case of  Charles Taylor 
(P6_TA(2005)0059), OJ C 304 E of  01/12/2005, 408; European Parliament Resolution on impunity 
in Africa and in particular the case of  Hissène Habré (P6_TA(2006)0101). 
44 European Parliament resolution of  26 April 2007 on the Annual Report on Human Rights in the 
World 2006 and the EU’s policy on the matter (2007/2020(INI)), OJ C 74E of  20.3.2008, 753–775, 
para 137: “in pursuit of  greater coherence of  internal and external policies, encourages the Council, the Commission 
and the Member States to incorporate the fight against impunity for serious international crimes in the development of  
a common EU area of  freedom, security and justice”; European Parliament resolution of  8 May 2008 on the 
Annual Report on Human Rights in the World 2007 and the European Union’s policy on the matter 
(2007/2274(INI)), OJ C 271E of  12.11.2009, 7–31, para. 144. 
45 European Parliament resolution of  26 April 2007 on the Annual Report on Human Rights in the 
World 2006 and the EU’s policy on the matter (2007/2020(INI)), OJ C 74E, 20.3.2008, 753–775, 
para 137: “Reiterates the importance of  EU internal policy promoting adherence to international human rights 
law and the need for Member States to legislate in a way consistent with, inter alia, the obligations arising out of  the 
Geneva Conventions, the Convention against Torture, the Genocide Convention and the Rome Statute of  the ICC”; 
European Parliament resolution of  8 May 2008 on the Annual Report on Human Rights in the World 
2007 and the European Union’s policy on the matter (2007/2274(INI)), OJ C 271E of  12.11.2009, 
7–31, para. 144; European Parliament resolution of  17 November 2011 on EU support for the ICC: 
facing challenges and overcoming difficulties (2011/2109(INI)), OJ 2013/C 153 E/13, paras. 16 and 
20: “Takes note of  the Cooperation and Assistance Agreement between the EU and the ICC; calls on the EU 
Member States to apply the principle of  universal jurisdiction in tackling impunity and crimes against humanity, and 
highlights its importance for the effectiveness and success of  the international criminal justice system”. 
46 European Parliament Resolution on the arrest of  General Pinochet in London, OJ C 341 of  
09.11.1998, 147; European Parliament Resolution on the proceedings against Ríos Montt, OJ 313 
E of  20.12.2006, 465-6; European Parliament resolution of  26 April 2007 on the Annual Report on 
Human Rights in the World 2006 and the EU’s policy on the matter (2007/2020(INI)), OJ C 74E of  
20.3.2008, 753–75, para 137; European Parliament resolution of  8 May 2008 on the Annual Report on 
Human Rights in the World 2007 and the European Union’s policy on the matter (2007/2274(INI)), 
OJ C 271E of  12.11.2009, 7–31, para. 144; European Parliament resolution of  17 November 2011 on 
EU support for the ICC: facing challenges and overcoming difficulties (2011/2109(INI)), OJ 2013/C 
153 E/13, para. 16: “Welcomes the contribution of  some EU Member States to the fight against impunity for the 
worst crimes known to humanity through the application of  universal jurisdiction”.  
47 Luc Reydams, The Application of  Universal Jurisdiction in the Fight against Impunity (European Parliament: 
2016): 10. 
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Furthermore, the EU’s support of  universal jurisdiction in its external action 
is mixed. While the EU conducts an important policy on the fight against impunity 
in its external relations, nonetheless, it has had to dilute its position with regard to 
universal jurisdiction, in response to the African Union’s criticism of  EU Member 
States’ practice on the matter described as “abusive”.48 In particular, African States 
held that “the exercise of  universal jurisdiction by European states is politically selective against 
them”, thus raising concerns over double standards.49 In this context, the EU and 
African Union established an advisory Technical Ad Hoc Expert Group on the 
Principle of  Universal Jurisdiction, which issued a report on the matter in 2009.50 
The following definition of  universal jurisdiction was provided: “Universal criminal 
jurisdiction is the assertion by one state of  its jurisdiction over crimes allegedly committed in the 
territory of  another state by nationals of  another state against nationals of  another state where the 
crime alleged poses no direct threat to the vital interests of  the state asserting jurisdiction. In other 
words, universal jurisdiction amounts to the claim by a state to prosecute crimes in circumstances 
where none of  the traditional links of  territoriality, nationality, passive personality or the protective 
principle exist at the time of  the commission of  the alleged offence”.51 
Moreover, it recognizes that this is a principle which finds its legal basis both 
in international treaty law – with special reference to the Geneva Conventions and 
Additional Protocol I – and customary law. Furthermore, it is deemed to apply to, 
inter alia, war crimes.52 On the overall, the report endorsed important but vague 
principles.53 Political and diplomatic consequences of  the use of  universal jurisdiction 
are also addressed, as the experts recommend the States to “bear in mind the need to 
avoid impairing friendly international relations”.54
This mixed endorsement is visible in other EU documents dealing with its 
external action. By way of  example, in the 2009 annual report on the main aspects and 
basic choices of  the CFSP, universal jurisdiction is explicitly mentioned as a “national 
instrument in the fight against impunity”.55 However, the report also emphasizes that this 
issue has “negative consequences for the relationships between EU and AU”.56 In the 2013 ‘Toolkit 
for Bridging the gap between international and national justice’, universal jurisdiction is seen as 
a means to “reduce the risk of  impunity”, in accordance with national authorities’ duty to 
prosecute alleged perpetrators of  international core crimes by virtue of  the principle 
of  complementarity.57 Nonetheless, no further details are provided on that matter. 
48 Council of  the European Union, AU-EU Technical Ad Hoc Expert Report on the Principle of  Universal 
Jurisdiction, 8672/1/19, Brussels, 16 April 2009, 4. 
49 Council of  the European Union, AU-EU Technical Ad Hoc Expert Report..., 35. 
50 Council of  the European Union, AU-EU Technical Ad Hoc Expert Report..., 4.  
51 Council of  the European Union, AU-EU Technical Ad Hoc Expert Report..., 6.   
52 Council of  the European Union, AU-EU Technical Ad Hoc Expert Report..., 6-9.   
53 Marco Sassòli and Djemila Carron, “EU Law and International Humanitarian Law” in A Companion 
to European Union Law and International Law, ed. Dennis Patterson and Anna Södersten (John Wiley & 
Sons: 2016), 419. 
54 Council of  the European Union, AU-EU Technical Ad Hoc Expert Report on the Principle of  Universal 
Jurisdiction, 8672/1/19, Brussels, 16 April 2009, 42. 
55 Council of  the European Union, Annual report from the High Representative of  the European Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of  the CFSP, 
10659/10, Brussels, 8 June 2010, 49. 
56 Council of  the European Union, “Annual report from the High Representative…”. 
57 European Commission; High Representative of  the European Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy, Joint Staff  Working Document on advancing the principle of  complementarity. Toolkit 
for Bridging the gap between international and national justice, Brussels, 31/01/2013, SWD(2013) 26 
final, 19: “It is equally important to introduce in national law all the provisions which are necessary for the national 
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In 2012, the European Commission expressed its view on universal jurisdiction 
on behalf  of  the EU in an amicus brief  presented before the US Supreme Court, in 
relation with the case ‘Kiobel vs. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co’.58 Even though this case 
concerned a civil suit for damages under the Alien Tort Statute, the Commission 
elaborated on universal criminal jurisdiction. 
In this brief, it provides for a quite general definition of  universal jurisdiction: 
“Universal criminal jurisdiction permits a State to prosecute universally condemned international 
crimes even when committed by aliens against aliens in the territory of  another sovereign”.59 A 
pure form of  universal jurisdiction is, therefore, acknowledged. In addition, the 
Commission refers to the concept of  an erga omnes obligation, to the extent that 
it grounds universal jurisdiction on the rationale according to which “the universally 
condemned crimes to which it extends are so repugnant that all States have a legitimate interest and 
therefore have the authority to suppress and punish them”.60 It also highlights that “universal 
criminal jurisdiction is well established under international law”.61 To illustrate such general 
acceptance, the Commission relies on International Treaty law, and for present 
purposes, on the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols. In particular, it 
acknowledges that such “treaties require States to extend universal jurisdiction over defined 
crimes where the alleged perpetrator is present within their territory”.62 Consequently, it endorses 
the view, seemingly based on State practice, that the alleged perpetrator’s presence 
on a State’s territory is a requirement for the activation of  universal jurisdiction 
mechanisms. As regards State practice, the Commission recognizes that it is “not 
widely exercised”63 but that the fact that it does not “upset comity between nations” is another 
argument in favor of  general acceptance.64 Nonetheless, it – surprisingly – uses the 
scarce number of  prosecutions as an additional argument in this sense.65
Moreover, it is worth mentioning the EU Genocide Network Strategy, which, 
as noted above, has been endorsed by the Council. It expressly recognizes that the 
Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols constitute the legal basis for “national 
authorities to seek out, investigate and prosecute or extradite those responsible for the commission of  
core international crimes, regardless of  where they are committed, and irrespective of  the nationality 
of  the perpetrator or the victim”.66
Secondly, in strict legal terms, the EU’s competence is quite limited, insofar as 
the exercise of  universal jurisdiction remains a national competence. Nonetheless, 
there are references to universal jurisdiction at the EU level in ‘Council Decision 
2003/335/JHA of  8 May 2003 on the investigation and prosecution of  genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes’, adopted within the frame of  judicial cooperation in criminal 
criminal courts to establish and exercise their jurisdiction. The adoption of  legal provisions establishing extensive extra-
territorial jurisdiction, or even universal jurisdiction, will reduce the risk of  impunity. No State Party to the Rome 
Statute should accept to host on its territory someone who is suspected of  having committed a crime falling within the 
jurisdiction of  the ICC, wherever this crime has been committed”. 
58 Luc Reydams, The Application of  Universal Jurisdiction…,10. 
59 Supplemental Brief  of  the European Commission on behalf  of  the European Union at Amicus 
Curiae in Support of  Neither Party, Supreme Court of  the United States, Judgment of  13 June 2012, 
Esther Kiobel et al., v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 14. 
60 Ibid., 16. 
61 Ibid., 14.  
62 Ibid., 15. 
63 Ibid., 14. 
64 Ibid., 16. 
65 Ibid. Also observed in: Luc Reydams, The Application of  Universal Jurisdiction…, 10. 
66 EU Genocide Network Strategy, 12. 
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matters. In particular, Recitals (6) and (7) express such support as they refer to the 
obligation of  EU Member States to extradite or prosecute alleged perpetrators from 
non-EU Member States accused of, inter alia, war crimes.67 Therefore, there is some 
form of  recognition at EU level of  the obligation to establish universal jurisdiction 
mechanisms at domestic level with regard to non-EU citizens seeking to enter and 
reside in the EU. Luc Reydams interprets this recognition as an obligation on EU 
Member States “to establish jurisdiction over international crimes by non-EU citizens who are 
seeking to enter and reside in the EU” under current EU law.68 Nonetheless, it seems 
more appropriate to consider that there is no legal obligation to do so under current 
EU law, insofar as Recitals are not legally binding and Council Decision 2003/335/
JHA establishes a more limited obligation of  cooperation among EU Member 
States on these matters. Consequently, it seems reasonable to assert that the support 
expressed in Recitals (6) and (7) is of  a political – not legal – nature. In any event, 
these provisions would most likely apply to low-profile perpetrators, namely refugees 
and migrants who cannot and often do not want to be extradited, rather than former 
heads of  State or government and other high-level officials.69
Finally, this uneven support in legal terms should not overshadow the important 
financial effort made by the EU on this matter. Indeed, the European Commission 
has financed several NGOs whose objective is to fight against impunity, including on 
the basis of  universal jurisdiction: e.g., the Coalition for the International Criminal 
Court, No Peace without Justice, Parliamentarians for Global Action, Redress, 
Avocats Sans Frontières and the Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l’Homme. 
In conclusion, according to Luc Reydams, “grassroots support for universal jurisdiction (and 
the ICC) within and outside Europe has been partially underwritten by the EU”.70
2. Operational support to the fight against impunity at the 
internal level
The EU has adopted a range of  instruments to foster judicial cooperation 
among EU Member States, in order to ensure that the EU does not become a safe 
haven for perpetrators.71 In this regard, Article 8 of  Council Decision 2011/168/
CFSP clarifies that the EU’s commitment in the fight against impunity exists within 
the frame of  its external action, but also extends to its internal policy: “The Union 
shall ensure consistency and coherence between its instruments and policies in all areas of  its 
external and internal action in relation to the most serious international crimes as referred to in 
the Rome Statute”.72 Developing tools at internal level is indeed necessary in order to 
avoid, to the largest possible extent, accusations of  double standards. If  the EU 
67 Council Decision 2003/335/JHA of  8 May 2003 on the investigation and prosecution of  genocide, 
crimes against humanity, and war crimes: “(6) Member States are being confronted on a regular basis with 
persons who were involved in such crimes and who are trying to enter and reside in the European Union. (7) The 
competent authorities of  the Member States are to ensure that, where they receive information that a person who has 
applied for a residence permit is suspected of  having committed or participated in the commission of  genocide, crimes 
against humanity or war crimes, the relevant acts may be investigated, and, where justified, prosecuted in accordance 
with national law”.
68 Luc Reydams, The Application of  Universal Jurisdiction…, 10. 
69 Luc Reydams, The Application of  Universal Jurisdiction…, 20. 
70 Luc Reydams, The Application of  Universal Jurisdiction…, 10. 
71 EU Genocide Network Strategy, 3; Stockholm Programme, 8. 
72 Council Decision 2011/168/CFSP of  21 March 2011 on the International Criminal Court and 
repealing Common Position 2003/44/CFSP, OJ L 76 of  22 March 2011, 58. 
® UNIO - EU LAW JOURNAL Vol. 4, No. 1, January 2018
63 Bettina Steible
were to succeed in compelling EU Member States to develop legislation on this 
matter, its efforts in the fight against impunity would be more credible, legitimate, 
and comprehensive.73
Even though the IHL Guidelines refer to the EU’s external action, they are 
indicative of  the EU’s approach to the concepts that they implement. In particular, 
the EU specifically refers to the obligation to extradite or prosecute in the Guidelines 
on promoting compliance with IHL in the following terms: “Individuals bear personal 
responsibility for war crimes. States must, in accordance with their national law, ensure that the alleged 
perpetrators are brought before their own domestic courts or handed over for trial by the courts of  
another State or by an international criminal tribunal, such as the International Criminal Court”. 
While the content of  this clause is not exactly the same as the one contained in the 
Geneva Conventions, there is no doubt that it recalls the obligation to extradite or 
prosecute. First, it refers to the obligation to prosecute: “States must (…) ensure that the 
alleged perpetrators are brought before their own domestic courts…”, and presents extradition 
as an alternative, including before international jurisdictions. 
In parallel to the IHL Guidelines, the EU has adopted a series of  legally binding 
instruments in relation to domestic prosecution of  war crimes within the frame of  the 
area of  Freedom, Security and Justice. In particular, it is worth mentioning Council 
Decision 2002/494/JHA, which established a ‘European network of  contact points in 
respect of  persons responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes’ (hereinafter, 
‘EU genocide network’), Council Decision 2003/335/JHA of  8 May 2003 on the 
investigation and prosecution of  genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, 
and the EU Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of  13 June 2002 on the European 
Arrest Warrant. The adoption of  such tools may be interpreted as a response to the 
commitment formalized by EU Members States in 2001 to work together to combat 
certain forms of  crime.74
The purpose of  Council Decision 2003/335/JHA is “to increase cooperation 
between national units in order to maximize the ability of  law enforcement authorities in different 
Member States to cooperate effectively in the field of  investigation and prosecution of  persons who 
have committed or participated in the commission of  genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes 
as defined in Articles 6, 7 and 8 of  the Rome Statute of  the International Criminal Court of  17 
July 1998”.75 Therefore, an international commitment of  the EU – cooperating with 
the ICC – is, in turn, used at the internal level in order to encourage EU Member States 
to take action on this issue. The Decision does not provide for precise obligations but 
solely establishes an obligation of  cooperation regarding the exchange of  information,76 
investigation, and prosecution77 of  individuals seeking residence in a Member State and 
allegedly accused of  having committed an international core crime.  
In the same line, the objective of  Council Decision 2002/494/JHA is to make 
cooperation more efficient through the establishment of  a EU Genocide Network 
within Member States’ police and justice systems.78 Concretely, EU Member States 
73 EU Genocide Network Strategy, 24.  
74 Council Common Position of  11 June 2001 on the International Criminal Court (2001/443/CFSP), 
recital 4.
75 Council Decision 2003/335/JHA of  8 May 2003 on the investigation and prosecution of  genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes, OJ L 118 of  14.5.2003, 12–14. 
76 Ibid. Art. 2.
77 Ibid. Art. 3. 
78 Council Decision 2009/426/JHA of  16 December 2008 on the strengthening of  Eurojust and 
amending Council Decision 2002/187/JHA setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight 
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must designate a contact point for the exchange of  information concerning the 
investigation of  international core crimes, including war crimes, as defined by the 
Rome Statute.79 These contact points must then provide information upon request 
or, on their initiative, that may be relevant in this context. Therefore, this Decision 
aims to establish the means of  cooperation on this matter, as the actual investigation 
and prosecution fall under the remit of  national authorities.80
In this context, a Secretariat was established in July 2011 within the staff  of  
Eurojust, although it works as a separate unit.81 Furthermore, it is worth noting that 
the EU Genocide Network cooperates with institutions from third States. As such, 
it includes observers from Canada, Norway, Switzerland, and the USA and works 
with representatives from the ICC, ad hoc international criminal tribunals, the ICRC, 
Interpol, and civil society organizations. The EU Genocide Network further liaises 
with representatives from the European Commission and Eurojust.82 In addition, a 
Task Force composed of  five contact points was established within this framework 
with a view to propose improvements in the fight against impunity’s efficiency.83  
The Task Force drafted a Strategy in this sense, published in 201484 and 
endorsed by the Council in its Conclusions of  15-16 June 2015.85 Some elements of  
the Strategy are worth mentioning here. It is stated that the EU Genocide Network 
holds “a pivotal role in ensuring the EU’s commitment to fighting impunity in the internal area”86 
and serves as a “best practice model for the development of  similar networks in other regions” 
as is already the case in the African Union framework.87 In addition, it provides a 
set of  measures addressed to EU institutions and Member States “to support national 
investigations and prosecutions of  core international crimes”.88
Concretely, the Strategy proposes several recommendations relating to 
procedures and the operational functioning of  the fight against impunity at national 
level, such as implementing measures to improve the identification of  cases and case-
relevant information (Measure 2), facilitating cooperation among the “immigration, 
law enforcement, prosecution, mutual legal assistance, financial and intelligence authorities” as well 
as with civil society (Measure 3). 
For present purposes, it is especially relevant mentioning the “desirability” of  the 
creation of  specialized units dealing exclusively with cases of  core international crimes 
(Measure 1). This recommendation should, therefore, be read in conjunction with 
Council Decision 2003/335/JHA on the investigation and prosecution of  genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes, which recommended – already in 2003 – “to 
set up or designate specialist units within the competent law enforcement authorities with particular 
against serious crimes, OJ L 138 of  04.06.2009, 12. 
79 Ibid., Art. 1. 
80 See: “Interview: EU a key player in ICC system”, Global Justice, February 03, 2015, accessed December 
5, 2017, https://ciccglobaljustice.wordpress.com/2015/02/03/eu-a-key-player-in-icc-system/. 
81 Council Decision 2009/426/JHA of  16 December 2008 on the strengthening of  Eurojust and 
amending Council Decision 2002/187/JHA setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight 
against serious crimes, OJ L 138 of  04.06.2009, 14, art. 25a. 
82 EU Genocide Network Strategy, 24.  
83 Ibid., 4. 
84 Ibid.  
85 Council conclusions on fight against impunity for the crime of  genocide, crimes against humanity 
and war crimes within the European Union and its Member States. 
86 EU Genocide Network Strategy, 24. 
87 Ibid., 25. 
88 Ibid., 32-45. 
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responsibility for investigating and, as appropriate, prosecuting the crimes in question”.89 At least 
Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, 
and the UK have created such units, which include officers specially trained to work 
in the identification, investigation or prosecution of, inter alia, war crimes, following a 
multidisciplinary approach.90 The creation of  these units has proven to meaningfully 
improve the prosecution of  alleged war criminals in the countries where they have 
established themselves. In this respect, the data presented in the Strategy on the 
number of  completed and ongoing cases in EU Member States unsurprisingly reflect 
this reality, with the bulk of  prosecutions taking place in the countries dotted with 
such specialized units.91
In the same way, Measure 4 explicitly refers to the need to improve domestic 
legislation relating to investigation, prosecution and mutual legal assistance so as to 
ensure that it appropriately reflects the current state of  International Customary 
and Treaty law, in particular, with regards to the obligation to extradite or prosecute. 
It, likewise, refers to the necessity to codify, in domestic law, the definition of  “core 
international crimes in accordance with international standards”, to provide for “an exercise 
of  extraterritorial, including universal, jurisdiction over those crimes”, so that the legislation 
adequately transposes the notions of  command or superior responsibility and “includes 
the relevant rules on the irrelevance of  superior order defenses and statutes of  limitation”.92 Special 
mention is also made to the necessity not to use immunity as an undue protection of  
alleged perpetrators. The Strategy also refers to the necessity to include the different 
types of  individual criminal responsibility for these crimes, namely command or 
superior responsibility, as well as the “relevant rules on the irrelevance of  superior order 
defenses and statutes of  limitation”.93 
Furthermore, other recommendations are addressed to the EU institutions, 
some of  which have already been implemented. Inter alia, the EU Genocide Network 
recommends evaluating the implementation of  Council Decision 2002/494/JHA 
and Council Decision 2003/335/JHA, to elaborate an Action Plan on the Fight 
against Impunity within the EU, or to assess additional funding possibilities in 
that framework.94 In that same line, it is worth noting that the proposal to create 
a European day against impunity for international crimes95 has been implemented.
Another instrument designed to enhance cooperation among EU Member 
States in relation to the fight against impunity is ‘Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA 
of  13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member 
States’.96 Even though framework decisions do not have direct effect,97 they oblige 
89 Council Decision 2003/335/JHA of  8 May 2003 on the investigation and prosecution of  genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes, OJ L 118 of  14.5.2003, 12–4, art. 4. 
90 EU Genocide Network Strategy, 27-9 and 33. 
91 Ibid., 30-32. 
92 Ibid., 40. 
93 Ibid., Measure 4. 
94 Ibid., 43. 
95 Ibid., 44. 
96 Luisa Vierucci, “The European Arrest Warrant: An Additional Tool for Prosecuting ICC Crimes”, 
Journal of  International Criminal Justice 2 (2004): 275–285. 
97 Art. 34(2) of  the Treaty of  the European Union as amended by the Treaty of  Nice reads as follows: 
“The Council shall take measures and promote cooperation, using the appropriate form and procedures as set out in 
this title, contributing to the pursuit of  the objectives of  the Union. To that end, acting unanimously on the initiative 
of  any Member State or of  the Commission, the Council may: […] (b) adopt framework decisions for the purpose 
of  approximation of  the laws and regulations of  the Member States. Framework decisions shall be binding upon the 
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EU Member States “to reach the requested result and set a standard level by which to interpret 
different national criminal legislation”.98 As such, they “generate a harmonizing effect on national 
criminal legislation within the Union”.99 The Framework Decision on the European Arrest 
Warrant replaces formal extradition procedures among EU Member States with a 
system of  mutual recognition of  criminal decisions, referred to as the cornerstone 
of  judicial cooperation.100 In particular, the purpose of  the Framework Decision is to 
introduce “a new simplified system of  surrender of  sentenced or suspected persons for the purposes 
of  execution or prosecution of  criminal sentences” allowing one to “remove the complexity and 
potential for delay inherent in the present extradition procedures”.101 The new system shall, 
therefore, aim to facilitate the “free movement of  judicial decisions in criminal matters, covering 
both pre-sentence and final decisions, within an area of  freedom, security and justice”.102  
To do so, the Framework Decision contains a list of  offences, which “if  they 
are punishable in the issuing Member State by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a 
maximum period of  at least three years and as they are defined by the law of  the issuing Member 
State, shall, under the terms of  this Framework Decision and without verification of  the double 
criminality of  the act, give rise to surrender pursuant to a European arrest warrant”.103 This list 
includes crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction. Therefore, this Framework Decision 
does not subject national authorities to the double jeopardy rule, nationality, and 
specialty requirements104 to hand over a suspect to another Member State. The 
Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant presents several advantages 
in the fight against impunity. It establishes a harmonised system of  arrest and 
surrender throughout the EU “which is unprecedented in any other region of  the world”.105 
More importantly, it allows national authorities to comply with their obligation to 
cooperate with the ICC without delay. Consequently, the Framework Decision has 
the potential to considerably facilitate proceedings whenever national authorities are 
willing to prosecute an alleged war criminal that has moved to another EU Member 
State. 
Thus, even though the EU retains limited competence on this matter, it has 
established a series of  tools that allow EU Member States to improve their cooperation 
in the apprehension and prosecution of  persons suspected of  having committed war 
crimes. Through these legal instruments, the EU, likewise, implements part of  its 
obligation to ensure respect for IHL, insofar as it facilitates the work of  national 
authorities to enforce Common Article 1 and Articles 49/50/129/146 of  the four 
Geneva Conventions. 
Member States as to the result to be achieved but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of  form and methods. 
They shall not entail direct effect”. Even though framework decisions no longer exist under the Lisbon 
Treaty architecture, their legal effects are preserved until they are repealed, annulled or amended. See: 
Protocol (nº 36) on Transitional Provisions, OJ 115 of  09/05/2008, 322-6, art. 9.
98 ECJ, Judgment of  16 June 2005, Case 103/05, Criminal proceedings against Maria Pupino. Quoted in: 
Wouters and Sudeshna, “The Creation of  a Global Justice System…”, 25. 
99 Wouters and Sudeshna, “The Creation of  a Global Justice System…”, 25. 
100 EU Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of  13 June 2002 on the European Arrest Warrant, OJ L 
190/1 of  18.07.2002, Preamble 
101 Ibid., recital 5. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid., art. 2. 
104 The last two requirements do meet exceptions, detailed in art. 4(6), 5(3), and 27. See: Luisa Vierucci, 
“The European Arrest Warrant: An Additional Tool for Prosecuting ICC Crimes”, 276.  
105 Luisa Vierucci, “The European Arrest Warrant…”, 277. 
